I definitely think Google is guilty of what the Commission has accused them of here, but I also can’t help but think: if pre-installing Google Search and Chrome are anti-competitive, why is Apple not guilty of the same thing? In fact, I’d argue that Apple is ten times worse in this regard because you actually can’t use any browser but Safari on iOS (all other browser apps are actually just re-skins of Safari under the hood). Does being a vertically-integrated company excuse such behaviour?

I didn’t say I use Windows. I only said that 7-Zip is the best archiving software available for it.

Unlike 7-Zip, which is actually free and also open-source as well

7-Zip is by far the best archiving software on Windows

On the backup line you can subscribe to the cheapest data-only plan for like $5 a month and then just add $20 worth of pay-as-you-go credit, which never expires and will be used for calls, at 1 cent per minute.

It will save you $5 a month on the backup phone plan, making it even cheaper.

If you spend US$3,000 on the Steam Machine your brain must be made of tofu.

Fun fact, Reddit users probably had a hand in this.

I’m not defending this action from Microsoft, but for most people, they buy a Microsoft product and then happily use it for years, none the wiser to any of Microsoft’s other nonsense happening in the background.

A: gets scammed by company

B: You’re so stupid, you should have known that company was going to scam you.

That doesn’t prove anything. There’s no proof that the person currently using it is the same person as the person who created the account.

By the way, you might also notice this argument also works against age verification systems where the user’s age is verified only once. Unless you intend to check their identity every single time they log in.

Age verification is just a ham-fisted way for the state to try to take over a role that should be exercised by parents. Parental controls exist, people!

Governments don’t hate privacy intrinsically. They just don’t think it’s important. Violating privacy using mass surveillance has no visible downside to the uninformed public. Policy makers just notice that destroying privacy makes it easier to catch cybercriminals and decide it’s a worthwhile trade off. You probably disagree with that. But there are far too many people who just go along with it.

Contabo is cheap but has some weird quirks. I pay about five euros a month. My server got mysteriously rolled by two days and they denied anything happened to it. I restored from backups but it was odd.

In general, we accept that the Government already knows who you are, how old you are, and where you live. That’s already a given. The purpose of a zero-knowledge age verification scheme is to allow a third party (not the Government) to be confident that a person is an adult, without being given any additional information or being able to deduce any additional information from what they’re given. So essentially, they get only 1 bit of information: whether the user is an adult (true/false). In practice, a perfect system is not possible, since the fact that you receive a response also means you get the answer to related questions, like whether the user possesses a Government-issued ID (obviously “true” if they can successfully complete the verification).

So, here’s how such a scheme might work. There are many possible implementations.

In the United States, we have (optional) digital ID cards. These are added to one’s digital wallet in a similar manner to payment cards and can be used for things like buying alcohol, getting through airport security, and driving. This digital infrastructure can be re-used.

1. An organisation which wants to perform digital identity verification generates a cryptographic key pair and registers the public key with a Government server ahead of time. The public key is published to a Government-run public keyserver.
2. A website who wants to verify a user’s age sends a verification request to a Government server, digitally signed with their private key. The server responds with a request ID, which is a random, but unique, string of characters.
3. The website provides this string to the user. The user copies the string.
4. The user opens their digital wallet, selects their ID card, and then opens the age verification feature. The user pastes the request ID into their digital wallet, which fetches information about the request from the Government server. Because the request which the request ID is associated with was signed using the organisation’s private key, the Government can tell the user who initiated the request.
5. The user is asked to confirm/deny the age verification request. If the user confirms the request, then a biometric will be required to access their private key (these are stored in the device’s keystore), sign the approval response, and then sent that response to the Government server. The Government server checks that the signature is valid and tied to the key associated with that ID before marking the verification request as completed.
6. After confirming, the user returns to the website and clicks a button which says “I’ve completed the verification.” The website then queries the request ID with the Government server (again, signing the request with their private key). The Government server responds with “completed” if the user has accepted the request, or “not completed” if the user has either not yet accepted the request or denied it.

It’s not a guarantee, but generally, digital ID systems live on the phone of one person only and require a screen lock to use. You’re right though, that there is nothing preventing someone else from borrowing another’s identity.

It is possible to construct a zero-knowledge proof using cryptography and adapting existing digital ID infrastructure. A user can prove that they have knowledge of a private key tied to an adult’s identification card without having to reveal the key, or the associated public key.

But that being said, whether something is possible and whether it is a good idea are two different questions.

It’s possible to construct an age-verification system that allows a user to verify they are over the age of 18 without divulging any other information whatsoever.

But that would defeat the point of “age” verification for these goons.

They should make a “Firefox Core” which contains only the browser with basic features, and then make another version which contains all the “fun” stuff.

America really has a litigation culture, not because people are particularly fond of lawsuits, but because problems which are generally solved by legislative enactments or actions by regulatory bodies in other countries, aren’t in the US, and thus the only way to find out who is right is to go to court.

I’m guessing what you’re suggesting is that Google’s proposal is the same as requiring all packages be signed and accompanied by an Extended Validation or Oragnisation Validation X.509 certificate.

While that would technically work, the problem with using the existing PKI is that it’s still very expensive to get EV/OV certificates. And the most common of these certs (those for TLS purposes) will soon only last 47 days which is, to put it mildly, would be a pain in the ass to use for package-signing.

While AI obviously is not perfect and is flawed in many ways, having AI sift through the torrent of comments and then flag problematic submissions for human review is likely going to be extremely effective with minimal false positives. Though I do say this as a person whose Reddit account is currently banned for 3 days for “inciting violence” because of a knife-based joke.

I read it as “Let’s end anti-consumerism” and thought “Well that’s a brave thing to post on Lemmy of all places”