zaironjacobs/get-gecko-driver
github.com
A tool to download and install GeckoDriver. Contribute to zaironjacobs/get-gecko-driver development by creating an account on GitHub.

Not all coders are created equal. But there should be a line where we collectively just say, “Please stop”.

Would like to say found two critical issues in two Python packages, but it’s obvious to a six year old. Not sure can claim credit for such in your face obvious issues.

And since it’s so obvious, responsible disclosure kinda got kicked to the curb.

These libraries pin the required dependencies and test only one python interpreter, so lets just say had lowered expectations going in.

get-gecko-driver and get-chrome-driver look like they are unneeded since both selenium and webdriver-manager can download selenium webdrivers. In the later two packages, web browser support is sparse; there is room for more flexibility. For example, support for waterfox, librewolf, and mullvad-browser.

Issues summary:

  1. downloader module can send a GET request to any URL. There is no URL whitelist. These packages can be used for cover when making arbitrary GET requests.

  2. downloader can save anywhere on the file system. So can be used for other purposes besides downloading selenium webdriver.

  3. no permission checks before saving/writing the file.

  4. get_gecko_driver.downloader and get_chrome_driver.downloader are the exact same module.

I lack confidence the author will respond, will be very pleasantly surprised if the author fix these issues in a timely manner. Nor confidence he’d do a good job. But at least these issues are disclosed and the ball is in his court.

For your entertainment:

All these coding errors are unforgivable and obvious to even a novice coder, a laymen, or a random drunk. It takes talent not to see it. If bothered to do unit testing, would be unavoidable to not see it.

These issues are both CRITICAL SECURITY issues.

Obvious is obvious, don’t kill the messenger, instead lets just fix this issue. The correct action is to quickly fix it and then just agree never to mention it again and pray there is no Darwin award for coders.

  • CameronDev@programming.dev
    3·
    1 month ago

    Anything you do to fix this “issue” can also be defeated by mock.patch.

    You could just mock.patch the entire download function to do anything at all.

    • logging_strict@programming.devOP
      1·
      1 month ago

      Had to research how to go about running untrusted code safely.

      In-process there are actions that can be taken to deter mock.patch, but it wouldn’t defeat a determined adversary. A subprocess isn’t a sufficient security layer although it would prevent mock.patch a module.

      To deter a determined adversary, recommend to use Docker or Firecracker MicroVMs.

      So glad we are having this conversation. Instead of jumping in with a fix that is not actually effective.

    • logging_strict@programming.devOP
      1·
      1 month ago

      Within a docker container, mitmproxy can sit filtering network traffic by URLs, rather than IP and port. Ignore in this example only one URL is allowed.

      In pyproject.toml,

      [project.scripts]
webdriver_urls_filter = "mypackage.somefolder.mitmproxy_runner:main"

      In mypackage.somefolder.mitmproxy_filters,

      import re
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING

from mitmproxy import ctx

if TYPE_CHECKING:
    from mitmproxy import http


def request(flow: "http.HTTPFlow") -> None:
    """Run this proxy.

    :type flow: mitmproxy.http.HTTPFlow
    """
    url = flow.request.pretty_url

    # Rather than exact, interested in limiting the base URL
    ALLOWED_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^https://github//.com/myorg/myrepo/releases/download/v1/.2/.3/.*$")
    
    # Check if URL matches the allowed release pattern
    
    try:
        if ALLOWED_PATTERN.match(url):
            ctx.log.info(f"Download allowed: {url}")
        else:
            ctx.log.error(f"Download blocked: {url}")
            flow.kill()
    except Exception as e:
        # FAIL SECURE: If inspection fails, kill the connection to prevent bypass
        ctx.log.error(f"Script error, blocking flow: {e}")
        flow.kill()

      In mypackage.somefolder.mitmproxy_runner,

      from mitmdump import DumpMaster
from mitmproxy import options

from . import mitmproxy_filters  # addon module

def main() -> None:
    """Rather than calling `mitmdump -s myscript.py`."""
    opts = options.Options(listen_port=8080)
    master = DumpMaster(opts)

    if hasattr(mitmproxy_filters, 'addons'):
        # explicit format which defines a class then appends an instance to
        # :code:`addons = []`
        master.addons.add(*mitmproxy_filters.addons)
    else:
        # Module itself acts as addon
        master.addons.add(mitmproxy_filters)
    
    master.run()

      The docker container has one network proxy which has web access. Everything else has no web access instead traffic is directed thru the proxy. The proxy calls, webdriver_urls_filter.